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Abstract
Between September and December 1925, the Second Polish Republic faced a so-called
twin-crisis: the złoty,3 the Polish currency, collapsed, and the financial system faced bank
runs and flights of deposits. On November 28, 1925, the Polish Government established
Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym (FPIK), injecting over PLN 60 million
capital through Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), a national development bank. The
government-led capital injection scheme kept supporting the unstable Polish financial
system during the inter-war period. Furthermore, in the 1930s, the FPIK served not only
the large banks but also smaller financial institutions, and sometimes, non-financial
companies. While the FPIK successfully buttressed the financial system, the scheme also
contributed to the emergence of authoritarian statism, as the state took significant
centralized control over the economy during the 1930s.
Keywords: Poland, broad-based, broad-based capital injection, capital injection,
centralized economy, FPIK, inter-war Europe

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial
Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
3 In this paper, “złoty,” as well as the currency notation “PLN,” refers to the Polish monetary unit from 1924 to
1935.
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Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym
(FPIK)
At a Glance
The Second Polish Republic (1918-39)
was established as the Treaty of
Versailles in June 1919 confirmed
Poland’s independence. After a period of
hyper-inflation in 1923, a new currency,
the złoty, was introduced. The new złoty
notes were issued as legal tender by a
newly established central bank, the Bank
Polski (Smith 1936). In the summer of
1925, the so-called second inflation
occurred, and the złoty became unstable.
Simultaneously, both the real economy
and the banking system started to
crumble. Farmer-debtors faced a plunge
in crop prices and became insolvent. In
September 1925, the financial system
started to face bank runs, and 58 percent
of private banks became insolvent
(Landau and Morawski 1995).
On September 4, 1925, the Bank Polski,
the central bank, lent 15 million złoty to
the five largest private banks (Bank
Handlowy in Warsaw, Bank of the Union
in Poznań, Ziemski Bank Kredytowy in
Lviv, Bank Zachodni in Warsaw, and
Bank United Polish Lands in Warsaw), as
deposits started to flow from Polish
banks. The loans were secured and paid
an interest rate of 8% (lower than the
usual lending rate of 12%) (Stelmach
2012; Morawski 1996).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To prevent banks from bankruptcy and to
avoid systemic risk (Morawski 1996, 64-70, 84).
Launch Dates

November 28. 1925

Sunset Dates

The original sunset date was
the end of 1927 but was
later reintroduced in 1931
(first round) (Stelmach 2012
66-67; DURP 1925 nr. 119,
859).

Program Size

PLN 65 million (first round)

Usage

PLN 63.4 million (first
round, by June 1926)

Outcomes

(i) The state banking sector
enjoyed much greater public
confidence, and (ii) the
improvement in the quality
of private-sector services,
forced both by the crisis and
the recovery programs
implemented in the banks
benefiting from the
assistance of the Credit
Assistance Fund
administered by BGK.
(Wierzbicki n.d.).

Key Features

Multiple means and flexible
threshold for the
governmental intervention.
Eventually, the facility
evolved as a part of
“Sanacja” (Sanation), a
political movement to
address perceived
corruption.

The Bank Polski loans in September
1925 seemed inadequate to halt the
panic in the financial system. However,
given the simultaneous currency instability, the central bank was reluctant to offer any
further aids, as it considered further funding from the central bank would lead to an
increase in the money supply and risk further inflation. In other words, the central bank
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decided to prioritize its mandate of currency stability over its financial-stability mandate
(Komierzyńska-Orlińska 2018; Morawski 1996). Thus, the government (led mostly by the
Ministry of Finance) took steps to protect the banking system (Landau 2007).
On September 21, 1925, the government established the Komitet Sanacji Banków (the Bank
Sanation Committee). Given the limited fiscal capacity, the government could only grant
PLN 25-28 million to the Committee, an amount met by the seigniorage from issuing new
coins. The Bank Sanation Committee provided PLN 26.9 million to troubled large banks
(Stelmach 2012; Morawski 1996). On October 13, 1925, the Bank Sanation Committee
announced that it had completed providing immediate help to the banks and was ready to
move on to the “second phase.” The second phase implied further structural changes within
the Polish financial system, including liquidation of branches and potential mergers. As the
central bank continued to prioritize currency stability, the government was the only actor
to initiate the second phase (Komierzyńska-Orlińska 2018; Morawski 1996).
The Bank Sanation Committee was transformed into Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom
Kredytowym (Credit Institutions Assistance Fund, hereafter FPIK) on November 28, 1925,
and was mandated to provide assistance to credit institutions and restructure the banking
system (Landau and Morawski 1995; Wierzbicki, n.d.). The government, initiated by the
Ministry of Finance, provided PLN 65 million to the FPIK (Landau and Morawski 1995).
The FPIK injected PLN 63.4 million into 15 financial institutions. The capital was injected
through Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), a national development bank which was
created by a merger of three public banks from the Galicia region (Morawski 1996). Bank
Handlowy SA in Warsaw received the largest injection of PLN 21.7 million, approximately
one-third of the entire injected capital. Furthermore, as a part of the FPIK, guarantees were
granted for foreign loans; according to Morawski (1996), the FPIK guaranteed PLN 1.0
million in foreign loans in 1925 and 0.8 million in 1926.
On May 17, 1927, the FPIK was terminated as the President of the Republic of Poland
determined that the financial crisis in 1925 was over and the FPIK had fulfilled its mandate
(Morawski 1996; DURP 1927 nr. 46). However, as the credit market fluctuated during the
Great Depression and as the Polish financial system encountered another banking crisis,
the FPIK was reintroduced. The Act of March 17, 1931, authorized the Minister of the
Treasury to spend PLN 20 million for bank rehabilitation (DURP 1931 nr. 3). In 1932, FPIK
was incorporated as a part of new regulation (Morawski 1996; DURP 1932 nr. 94) and
continued to support the Polish financial system during the inter-war period, with minor
amendments made in November 1935.
It is also worth noting that, from its establishment, the FPIK served political means. This
was particularly true after the May 1926 coup d’états. The FPIK evolved as a part of
“Sanacja” (“sanation,” or “healing”), a political movement to address perceived corruption,
and the bill which legally established the FPIK was called the “Sanation bill.” As a result of
regulation passed in 1932, BGK had new tools including debt relief, debt cancellations,
guarantees, and capital injections. Following the new rule, FPIK could acquire equity in
banks and private enterprises. The rule eventually enabled the government’s takeover of
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targeted troubled institutions (Wierzbicki n.d.; Morawski 1996). For instance, during the
1930s, some private enterprises and state banks secured debt and capital using FPIK
despite their apparent difficulties in repayment. These private enterprises were selected
based on their significance for military, economic, and political reasons. The BGK, the
conduit of the FPIK, took over those private enterprises under its direct management,
establishing the so-called “syndicate of the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego,” whose shares
amounted to PLN 39 million by 1935 and PLN 43.9 million by 1939 (Landau and Morawski
1995; Wierzbicki, n.d.). Meanwhile, the BGK and other state banks also benefitted from the
extensive governmental support including through capital and legal privileges, like tax
deduction (Landau and Morawski 1995).
Summary Evaluation
The 1925 capital injection by the FPIK was effective for those large financial institutions
that could participate in the scheme; however, the scope of the FPIK was limited to large
banks, as the government faced severe budget constraints. After the revival in 1931, the
FPIK could inject capital not only to large banks but also to the municipal savings banks
and cooperative banks (Wierzbicki n.d.). While literature evaluating the capital injection is
scarce, Morawski (1996) considers the capital injection after the 1930s revival as
unsuccessful compared to that of 1925 as some participating financial institutions failed
shortly after the capital injection in 1931.
From a macroeconomic perspective, some consider the crisis of 1925 and accompanying
policy responses, including the establishment of FPIK by the government, as having a
significant impact on the Polish banking system and policies.
First, some authors have criticized the central bank’s passive approach to its financial
stability mandate and its prioritization of currency stability. This is supposedly because in
the wake of the hyperinflation of the early 1920s The Bank Polski continued to provide
banks discounted loans from the late 1920s to 1930s, but only to an extent that would align
with its interest in currency protection. This can be interpreted as a fair decision, given the
Bank was only recently created in order to fight against the hyperinflation (Morawski
1996).
Second, the government became far more influential in the field of financial stability. For
instance, in 1926, the government reformed the banking law, established the Banking
Commissariat (Komisariatu Bankowego) within the Ministry of Finance, and reshaped the
banking system. In December 1926, the Ministry of Finance rigorously enforced minimumshare capital requirements and liquidated smaller banks that could not meet the
requirements. Therefore, the government was committed to enforce hard stances on
private banks, as it had seen how the collapse of a bank could lead to a systemic crisis, and
it had spent its limited fiscal budget on the FPIK. The government viewed the fragility
within the financial system as caused by small and weak banks, which were mainly
engaged in currency trading activities and not much lending (Landau 2007; Morawski
1996). Landau and Morawski (1995) note that the credibility of the private banking sector
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decreased after the crisis in 1925. Consequently, they stated that the “trauma persisted and
became one of the premises of étatisme4 in banking in the following period,” leading to
statism in Poland.
During the crisis in 1925, foreign investors took advantage of the crisis, demanding that
Polish banks repay foreign currency denominated loans. The Polish banks, which could not
repay the loans in time (and had little access to the governmental aids, including the FPIK),
were often taken over by foreigners. Dependency on foreign capital continued and became
even more prominent after the crisis of 1925. As of 1930, the total contribution of foreign
capital accounted for approximately one-third of the entire banking system’s capital. Polish
private banks relied on funding from foreign investors; however, most of the funding was
short- and medium-term as investors were worried about the fragility of an economy
situated between Germany and the Soviet Union (Morawski 1996; Landau and Morawski
1995).
Consequently, following the crisis of 1925 and the capital injection by the FPIK, the banking
industry structure had changed, notably, in two ways. First, state-owned banks grew
significantly while both the number and shares of private banks decreased due to
governmental policies. Second, private banks became more dependent on government
(state) capital and on foreign capital (Landau and Morawski 1995). The Ministry of Finance
preferred to have fewer private banks. The government thought that along with state
banks, several large private banks could thrive, attracting deposits and financing domestic
and export trends; however, it was hard for private banks to compete with state banks,
which benefitted from various governmental supports. Eventually, private banks gave up
building long-term credit and focused more on short-term credit (Morawski 1996).
However, the increased dependency on foreign capital had unintended ramifications
during the Great Depression and the consequent banking crisis in 1930. The significant
differences between the crisis of 1925 and the crisis of the 1930s was that Polish banks, to
some extent, benefitted from the credit assistance from foreign banks in 1925. In contrast,
in the 1930s, Polish banks faced a significant outflow of foreign capital as the international
economy went into the Great Depression (Morawski 1996).

4

Refers to Polish statism.
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Poland Context 1996
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
debt)
Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance
Source: Morawski 1996,48
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a package: The FPIK package included direct aid to banks as well as
government guarantees for foreign loans.
The original FPIK package in 1925 also included guarantees for foreign loans (PLN 1.0
million in 1925 and PLN 0.8 million in 1926), and the government could initiate the
assistance in foreign currency, if necessary (Morawski 1996).
The FPIK was established on November 28, 1925, to rescue troubled banks and prevent
potential systemic risk in the Polish financial system.
FPIK was terminated in May 1927, as the scheme was considered to have fulfilled its
mandate (DURP 1927 nr. 46). However, as the credit market fluctuated during the Great
Depression, the FPIK was reintroduced in 1931, and was incorporated into regulation in
1932 (Morawski 1996; DURP 1931 nr. 36). The FPIK kept supporting the Polish financial
system during the inter-war period.
2. Legal authority: The FPIK was established by the Sanation Bill, which was passed
on November 28, 1925. Though it was terminated in 1927, the scheme was
reintroduced during the 1930s crisis and was incorporated as a regulation in
1932.
In September 1925, the Władysław Grabski government drafted the “Sanation Bill.” Some
believed this bill to be based on the government’s experiences in operating the Bank
Sanation Committee, which performed ad-hoc capital injections between September and
October 1925. After Grabski retired in November, the new government led by Skrzyński
took on and submitted the bill to Sejm (the lower house). The Sanation bill passed on
November 28, 1925. The bill authorized the Minister of the Treasury to assist credit
institutions through the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), an existing national
development bank, and granted 65 million złoty to the newly established FPIK (Morawski
1996). The Sanation Bill was part of “Sanacja” (Sanation), a political movement to address
perceived corruption. The Sanation movement became particularly active after the May
1926 coup d’états.
The submitted bill, DURP 1925 nr. 119, Article 6.4 authorized the following features of the
FPIK:
• The sunset date of the FPIK: The end of 1927;
•

The eligibility for financial institutions: Credit institutions which displayed
economic need;

•

The collateral conditions: The assistance was subject to appropriate collateral in
the form of the (i) loans, (ii) guarantees, or (iii) “other financial operations that
will prove necessary” in the liquidation of liabilities;
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•

The arrangements on the detailed terms of the loan (the interest rate, the
method of calculating interest, the dates and manner of repayment of the
principal, and others): To be determined by the Minister of the Finance;

•

The size of the program: PLN 65 million.

Though the FPIK was terminated by the bill in May 1927, on March 17, 1931, a new law
reinstated the program (DURP 1927 nr. 46; DURP 1931 nr. 36). The revived capital
injection framework was mostly consistent with the original FPIK of 1925, but the size of
the fund promised was significantly smaller. The new law in 1931 only authorized the FPIK
to spend 20 million złoty for restoration of the financial system. Later critics have argued
that the insufficient funds led to the failing of a few banks that had accepted assistance
from the FPIK (Morawski 1996). In 1932, the FPIK, which had been implemented in the
form of ad-hoc bills (with expiration dates), was finally incorporated into a regulation
(DURP 1932 nr. 94; Morawski 1996). Reflecting the lessons the government had learnt
from the past injections, the collateral condition was eased, including state guarantee, and
the State Treasury (within a fixed quota of PLN 20 million) (DURP 1932 nr. 94).
Furthermore, the regulation also newly assured more flexibilities to the Minister of the
Finance, enabling receivable redemptions and any other changes in the design of the capital
injection if deemed necessary.
The regulation in 1932 did not have a specified sunset date. Morawski (1996) notes that
capital injections undertaken on the basis of the 1932 regulation were much more effective
than those under the ad-hoc 1931 bill. He also notes that the legal framework and the
operation became more complex involving a multi-level combination of reliefs, allowances,
guarantees, loans, and ownership changes. The regulation was amended in 1935 (DURP
1935 nr. 85).
3. Governance: The establishment of the FPIK, as well as the earlier Bank Sanation
Committee, was initiated by the government, mostly by the Ministry of Finance.
By contrast, the Bank Polski, the central bank, had little involvement despite its
financial stability mandate.
The establishment of the FPIK, as well as the Bank Sanation Committee, was initiated by the
government, mostly by the Ministry of Finance. By contrast, the Bank Polski, the central
bank, had little involvement despite its financial stability mandate.
The Governance of the Bank Sanation Committee
On September 21, 1925, the government established the Bank Sanation Committee under
the leadership of the Deputy Minister of Treasury and a member of the BGK Council, Józef
Karśnicki. The Committee was composed of two delegates of the Ministry of Treasury and
one delegate from each of Bank Polski SA (the central bank), BGK, and Związek Banków w
Polsce (ZBwP, the Polish Bank Association). Ad-hoc assistance was to be provided to
eligible banks through BGK on the order of the Ministry of Treasury.
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BGK
BGK was an existing government development bank which was established by a merger of
three public Galician banks (Polski Bank, Krajowy Bank for Reconstruction, and Zakład
Kredytowy Miejski Małopolskie) (Landau 1993). It grew significantly over the inter-war
period by assisting governmental state-led economic policies (Mazur 2018).
The Governance of the FPIK
Similar to the Bank Sanation Committee, the creation of the FPIK was initiated by the
government. The FPIK was operated through BGK as well (Morawski 1996).
Notably, the FPIK’s capital injection was initiated by the government, not by the central
bank, though the government originally argued that financial stability falls under the
central bank’s mandate. Two government officials, Henryk Kaden and Zygmunt
Chrzanowski, strongly protested against the BGK directing the aid to banks when drafting
the bill for the FPIK. In their opinion, such aid should be provided by the central bank.
However, the Bank Polski refused to take on the role, and maintaining financial stability
eventually fell to the government (Morawski 1996). Morawski (1996) explains and
criticizes the central bank for being reluctant to participate in financial stability policies as
it prioritized defending the currency.
4. Size: The first round of the FPIK in 1925 had PLN 65 million and 15 financial
institutions had PLN 63.4 million capital injected. The second round of the FPIK
in 1931 was much smaller in size: PLN 20 million.
When the Sanation Bill was drafted in late September to October in 1925, the original
intended size was 100 million złoty. However, when the bill was reviewed by the Sejm (the
lower house), the amount was reduced to PLN 65 million (Morawski 1996). The FPIK
injected PLN 63.34 million in capital in 15 financial institutions. In the second round in
1931, the size of the FPIK was reduced to PLN 20 million.
5. Timing: The bill that established the FPIK in 1925 expired in 1927, as the
government determined that the capital injection scheme had fulfilled its goals.
After FPIK’s revival in the 1930s, it was incorporated into regulation without a
specific expiration date. While the bills or regulations did not determine the
timing of capital injections, most financial institutions seem to have received
assistance right after the bill in 1925 passed.
On May 17, 1927, the FPIK was terminated as the President of the Republic of Poland
determined that the financial crisis in 1925 was over and the FPIK had fulfilled its goals
(Morawski 1996; DURP 1927 nr. 46). In 1932, the FPIK, which had been implemented in
the form of ad-hoc bills (with expiration dates), was finally incorporated into a regulation
(DURP 1932 nr. 945; Morawski 1996). The regulation in 1932 did not have a specified
sunset date.
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While the bills or regulations did not determine the timing of capital injections, most
financial institutions seem to have received assistance right after the bill in 1925 passed.
Although there were no specific legal requirements of constraints in the timing of the FPIK
assistance, the capital was quickly injected. The swiftness was partially due to the
government’s fear that if the FPIK did not intervene soon enough, foreign investors could
take over private Polish banks. This concern materialized during the Great Depression;
foreign shareholders in Polish banking grew as a result of taking over the share capital of
credit institutions indebted to foreigners (Landau 2007).
6. Source of funds: The government had a difficult time securing the funds for the
injection and met the needs with seigniorage and foreign debts.
Throughout the inter-war period, the government seems to have faced difficulty in securing
the funding for the FPIK. Particularly, during the crisis in 1925 and the 1930s, the economy
and the fiscal balance deteriorated significantly. For the Bank Sanation Committee
established in September 1925, the government managed to grant PLN 25-28 million only
from issuing new coins and raising the seigniorage (Morawski 1996). Landau (2007)
suggests that part of the FPIK funding was also provided by the government’s foreign
debts.
According to Wierzbicki (n.d.), the long-term loans granted by BGK came from two sources.
One was the BGK’s own funds, while the other was the state funds received by BGK, the
purpose of which was precisely defined by the government. Article 7 of the Decree of the
President of the Republic of Poland of May 30, 1924, also clearly stated that “funds
allocated from the state budget for credit purposes, unless they are directly available to the
state authorities, may only be administered by the Bank [BGK].” In practice, however, it
was quite often the case that BGK did not receive funds from the state to finance certain
tasks and thus granted the state an informal loan. The government’s repayment of this loan
in the event of a budget deficit could vary. In the first months of its operation, BGK did not
have sufficient funds to develop a long-term loan. The scale of this type of financing in the
inter-war period is best illustrated by the figures. Between 1924 and 1938, BGK granted
long-term loans amounting to nearly 2 billion zlotys. The majority of this sum came from
deposits from the Ministry of Treasury and funds serviced by BGK from state specialpurpose funds, although the exact separation of these two sources also depended on the
method of accounting in balance sheets. There were cases where long-term and issue loans
were booked as coming from the bank’s own funds, despite the fact that these loans were
partly realized through the purchase by the state of securities issued by BGK and
government deposits. Thus, the majority of long-term loans granted by BGK between 1924
and 1938 came from the bank’s own funds (PLN 1,095 million) and PLN 895 million from
state resources.
7. Eligible institutions: Larger banks were prioritized given the limit of fiscal space
in the government.
While the eligibility was only loosely defined in both 1925 and 1932 regulation on FPIK,
not all financial institutions could participate in the FPIK (DURP 1925 nr. 119; DURP 1932
nr. 94). The government was selective given the limit of the available funding.
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Furthermore, the government intended to leverage the scheme to increase the efficiency
in the credit market, by forcing smaller and weaker banks to exit.
The first round of FPIK excluded small-credit institutions. This was due to two reasons.
First, given the tight budget, the government lacked fiscal space to support all financial
institutions. The government prioritized large banks over smaller ones. Second, the
government hoped that the smaller and weaker financial institutions would exit from the
credit market, given the over-competitive nature of the credit market (Landau 1993;
Landau and Morawski 1995). The government did not intend to provide assistance to
credit institutions that were not in the state’s interest, focusing on providing substantial
assistance to institutions that were essential for servicing the national economy (Landau
2007). Most smaller financial institutions were involved in various currency operations
and were not much involved in lending or the credit market, and thus did not meet the
interest of government support (Landau 1993). Figure 1 below shows the capital injection
deployed by year and month, and Figure 2 below shows recipients of the capital injection.
Figure 1. Aid installments by Bank Sanation Committee and the FPIK (first round in
1925; as of December 31, 1926)
Aid installments
(in million PLN)
1925
September

10.2

October

16.7

November

5.5

December

8.2

1926
January-June

20.5

Total

61.1

Source: Morawski 1996.
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Figure 2. Debtors of the FPIK (first round; as of December 31, 1926)

Bank Name

The Amount
of the Debt
(in min PLN)

Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA

21.7

Bank Ziemiański SA w Warszawie

8.5

Polski Bank Przemysłowy SA we Lwowie

7.3

Bank Małopolski SA w Krakowie

6.9

Bank Przemysłowców SA w Poznaniu

6

Bank Związku Spółek Zarobkowych SA w Poznaniu

5.2

Ziemski Bank Kredytowy SA we Lwowie

3.3

Polski Bank Komunalny SA w Warszawie

1

Bank M. Stadthagen SA w Bydgoszczy

0.9

Dom Bankowy T. Bunimowicz w Wilnie

0.7

Wileński Prywatny Bank Handlowy SA w Wilnie

0.6

Bank Przemysłowców Polskich SA w Warszawie

0.5

Śląski Bank Przemysłowy SA w Bielsku*

0.5

Bank Zjednoczonych Ziem Polskich SA w Warszawie

0.3

Bank Handlowo-Przemysłowy SA w Łodzi

0.1**

Total

63.4

*During the merger with Polski Bank Przemysłowy SA in
Lviv.
**Debt fully repaid by the end of 1926.
Source: Morawski 1996.

The FPIK in 1931 and afterwards seemed to have had a similar criterion: prioritizing
larger, significant private banks before the smaller ones. In 1931, the aid was granted to the
following five banks: Polski Bank Przemysłowy SA in Warsaw, Bank M. Stadthagen SA in
Bydgoszcz, Bank Ziemiański SA in Warsaw, Pomorskie Bank Rolnicze SA in Toruń, and
Bank Ziemian SA in Poznań (Morawski 1996). Morawski (1996) also suggests that the
government increased its efficiency in capital injections and officializations, learning
lessons from the capital injections in 1920s.
8. Repayment/debt restructuring plan: As well as the capital characteristics (e.g.,
interest rate), the Finance Minister was granted an autonomy in determining the
details of repayment.
As well as the capital characteristics (e.g., interest rate), the Finance Minister was granted
autonomy in determining the details of repayment (DURP 1932 nr. 94). While not much
information is available on the actual repayment by banks, according to Stelmach (2012),
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financial institutions started paying back as early as June 1926 after the first FPIK
assistance in 1925.

References and Key Program Documents
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
(DURP 1925) nr. 119. Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1925.
Law authorizing capital injection in 1925.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/dziennik-ustaw-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-1925-durp1925-nr-119-p-859.
(DURP 1927) nr. 46. Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1927.
Revision to the DURP 1925.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/dziennik-ustaw-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-1927-durp1925-nr-46-p-400.
(DURP 1931) nr. 36. Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1931.
Revision to the DURP 1927.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/dziennik-ustaw-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-1931-durp1931-nr-36-p-271.
(DURP 1932) nr 94. Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1932.
Revision to the DURP 1932.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/dziennik-ustaw-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-1932-durp1932-nr-94-p-815.
Key Academic Papers
(Komierzyńska-Orlińska 2018) Komierzyńska-Orlińska, Eliza. “The Foundation and
Organization of the Bank of Poland Joint Stock Company.” Annales Universitatis Mariae
Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio G, (Ius) 65, no. 1 (March 21, 2018): 53.
Research paper on the Bank of Poland Joint Stock Company.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/foundation-and-organization-bank-poland-joint-stockcompany.
(Landau 1993) Landau, Zbigniew. “Sektor Państwowy w Bankowości Drugiej
Rzeczypospolitej - State Sector in Banking of the Second Republic of Poland,” 1993.
Research paper on State involvement in banking sector.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/sektor-panstwowy-w-bankowosci-drugiejrzeczypospolitej.
(Landau 2007) Landau, Zbigniew. “Are the Experiences of the Interwar Polish Banking
Useful for Contemporary Banking in Poland?” Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 15, no. 7
(December 1, 2007): 282–87.

582

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

Research paper on the history of banking in Poland.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/are-experiences-interwar-polish-banking-usefulcontemporary-banking-poland.
(Landau and Morawski 1995) Landau, Zbigniew, and Wojciech Morawski. “Polish Banking
in the Inter‐War Period.” In Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe Between the Wars,
edited by Charles H. Feinstein, 358–73. Oxford University Press, 1995.
Research paper on Polish banking in the inter-war period.
(Mazur 2018) Mazur, Zachary Adam. “Financing the Nation: The Polish State and Economic
Growth, 1918-1939,” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2018.
Research paper on Polish economic history.
(Morawski 1996). Morawski, Wojciech. “Bankowość Prywatna w II Rzeczypospolitej Private Banking in the Second Republic of Poland,” 1996.
Research paper on private banking in Poland.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/sektor-panstwowy-w-bankowosci-drugiejrzeczypospolitej.
(Smith 1926) Smith, Lawrence. “The Zloty, 1924-35.” Journal of Political Economy, April
1936.
Research paper on Polish economy.
(Stelmach 2012) Stelmach, Mikołaj. “Polski kryzys walutowy i bankowy 1925 r. (Polish
currency and banking crisis 1925. Econometric approach).” 1925, 24.
Research paper on Polish currency and banking crisis 1925.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/polski-kryzys-walutowy-i-bankowy-1925-r-ujecieekonometryczne-0.
(Wierzbicki n.d). Wierzbicki, Mateusz. “BGK i Państwowe Fundusze.” n.d.

Copyright 2021 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this material or to receive
permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the Yale Program for Financial
Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

583

